竞争法(双语)课程07-antimonopoly-law3-ADP课件.ppt
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- 竞争 双语 课程 07 antimonopoly law3 ADP 课件
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1、JUFE Yu Ling1Part 2Antimonopoly Law:Chinese PerspectiveJUFE Yu LingLearning Objectives(1)Define Dominant Market Position(2)Define Tying and Bundling(3)Explain Predatory Pricing(4)Explain RPM(5)Price Discrimination JUFE Yu Ling3Content1.Dominant Market Position2.Abuse of a Market Dominant Position3.T
2、ying and Bundling 4.Predatory Pricing5.Price DiscriminationJUFE Yu Ling4Chapter 6Abuse of a Market Dominant PositionJUFE Yu Ling1.Dominant Market Position(1)Definitiona)It refers to the undertaking(s)having the ability to control the price,quantity or other trading conditions of products in relevant
3、 market,or to hinder or affect other undertakings to enter the relevant market.JUFE Yu Lingb)The Original Power of Dominant PositionEconomic PowerIntellectual Property Rights Administrative PowerJUFE Yu Ling(2)Factors to finding dominant market position(i)market share in relevant market,and the comp
4、etition situation of the relevant market;(ii)ability to control the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets;(iii)financial status and technical conditions of the undertaking;(iv)the degree of dependence of other undertakings;(v)entry to relevant market by other undertakings;(vi)other fa
5、ctors related to find a dominant market position.7JUFE Yu Ling(3)How to assume a dominant market position?a)Undertakings that have any of the following situations can be assumed to be have a dominant market position:(i)the relevant market share of one undertaking accounts for1/2 or above;(ii)the joi
6、nt relevant market share of two undertakings accounts for 2/3 or above;(iii)the joint relevant market share of three undertakings accounts for 3/4 or above.8JUFE Yu Ling(b)DefensesUndertakings with a market share of less than 1/10 will not be deemed as occupying a dominant market position even if th
7、ey fall within the scope of second or third item.When the Undertakings assumed to have a dominant market position can prove that they do not have a dominant market,shall not be assumed to have a dominant market position.9JUFE Yu Lingone 1/2 two 2/3 three 3/410JUFE Yu Ling2.Abuse of a Market Dominant
8、 Position The Requirements of Abusing 1)Undertakings of a dominant market position2)Abusing behaviors (i)sell commodities at unfairly high prices or buy commodities at unfairly low prices;(ii)sell commodities at prices below cost without legitimate reasons;(iii)refuse to trade with counterparty with
9、out legitimate reasons;11JUFE Yu Ling(iv)require its counterparty to trade exclusively with it or trade exclusively with the appointed undertakings without legitimate reasons;(v)tie products or require as unreasonable conditions for trading without legitimate reasons;(vi)apply dissimilar prices or o
10、ther transaction terms to equivalent counterparties;(vii)other conducts identified as abuse of a dominant position by antimonopoly execution authorities.12JUFE Yu LingJUFE Yu LingTying and bundling are so ubiquitous that we forget they are there.Tying and bundling are,roughly speaking,what the moder
11、n firm does.Its the rationale.It puts things together and offers them in packages to consumers.14JUFE Yu Ling15(1)DefinitionsBundlingTying pure bundling:selling products only as a bundle,not individually mixed bundling:selling products as a bundle and individually making the sale of one good(the tyi
12、ng good)conditional on the sale of another good(the tied good)Elements certain forms of bundling of two separate products through coercion(?)Economic conceptLegal conceptJUFE Yu LingChinaTying is the practice of making the sale of one good(the tying good)to the de facto or de jure customer condition
13、al on the purchase of a second distinctive good(the tied good).It is often illegal when the products are not naturally related.Ex.a bookstore requiring the customer buy an unpopular book before allowing them to purchase a bestseller.16JUFE Yu Ling(2)Why to tie?1)to exclude competitors 2)to raise the
14、 cost of competitors 3)to facilitate the conspiracy with the competitors 17JUFE Yu Ling18(3)Economic AnalysisChicago School Recognition of efficiencies reduction in production/distribution costs product improvement quality assurance/compatibility pricing Limited motive to leverage a monopoly into an
15、other market single monopoly profit theorem Tying is(almost)always benignClassical Tying Approach Leverage theory:a firm extends its dominance through tying and is able to earn a second monopoly profit“Tying deemed to serve no legitimate business purpose”Tying is(almost)always harmfulPost-Chicago Ch
16、icago School did not address oligopolistic markets Anti-competitive scenarios foreclosure of the competitive market protection of the monopoly market others?Tying is frequently benign but can be harmful in certain circumstancesJUFE Yu LingIn view of their potential efficiencies,many economists belie
17、ve that,in general,tying and bundling are more likely to be procompetitive than anticompetitive.19JUFE Yu Ling20(4)Error Cost Analysis(1)ActualImpactLegalStandardHarmfulNot HarmfulIllegalCases that are both harmful and illegalCases that are not harmful even though they violate the legal ruleLegalCas
18、es that are harmful even though they do not violate the legal ruleCases that are benign and legalKey Factorsfrequency of harmful casesrate of false acquittals and false convictionserror costsJUFE Yu Ling21Error Cost Analysis(2)Per Se Legality Rule of Reason Per Se IllegalityCourt of Appeals in Micro
19、soft IIICommission decision in MicrosoftModified Per Se-Jefferson ParishPer Se approach in Hilti and Tetra Pak IIStandard of proof for competitive harmEC lawU.S.lawEconomic AnalysisChicago SchoolPost-ChicagoClassical ApproachJUFE Yu Ling22(5)Legal Analysis(1)Modified Per Se of Jefferson ParishTestKe
20、y IssuesMarket dominanceSeparate products test+CoercionEffect on commerceJustification and defencesSeparate products test as a rough proxy for net efficienciesBias in Enforcement(over-enforcement)JUFE Yu Ling23Legal Analysis(2)Commissions Rule of Reason approach in MicrosoftTestKey IssuesMarket domi
21、nanceSeparate products testRestriction of competition+Efficiency justificationLow threshold for separate products testRequisite legal standardNeed for indispensability requirementJUFE Yu Ling Three legal approaches to tying the modified per se approach(Jefferson Parish)the per se approach(Hilti and
22、Tetra Pak II)the Commissions“rule of reason”approach24JUFE Yu Ling25(5)Conclusions1)Analysis of the anticompetitive effects of tying and bundling by U.S.courts,by contrast,has evolved over time.Major legal rules tend to be more hostile towards tying than is justified according to economic analysis.2
23、)Although courts long have expressed concern that tying or bundling might enable firms to use monopoly power in one market as leverage to curb competition,and thereby acquire monopoly power,in a second market,judicial concern has eased as tying and bundling have become better understood.JUFE Yu Ling
24、3)Judicial principle has been changed:During the past,it been thought to be worthy of per se condemnation without examination of any actual competitive effects.At present,it is deemed per se illegal under U.S.Supreme Court rulings only if specific conditions are met,including proof that the defendan
25、t has market power over the tying product.Further,the Supreme Court has recently recognized that competitive markets and tying arrangements are not incompatible.Indeed,some lower courts have required proof of likely or actual anticompetitive effects and efficiencies in tying cases.26JUFE Yu Ling(6)I
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