CertificationofRotorcraftandFHAProcess：旋翼机和FHA过程认证课件.ppt

1、Presented to:Federal AviationAdministrationCertification of Rotorcraft and FHA ProcessAEAJanuary 31,20122Federal AviationAdministration2OUTLINECertification Process Installation of Complex Systems in Normal Category Rotorcraft XX.1301&XX.1309 Comparison Guidance Material Compliance with 27/29.1309 S

2、ystem Safety Assessment Items to be aware of FHA/SSA Questions 3Federal AviationAdministration3Certification Process1.Application(e.g.TC,ATC,STC,ASTC)2.Certification Basis defined.3.Certification Plans:Detail how compliance will be shown for each rule(27.1309 analysis,ground test,flight test,etc.).D

3、efine level of FAA involvement(delegation).4.Test planning&execution.5.Data/Test Review:FAA reviews/witnesses tests as necessary.6.TC/STC issued.4Federal AviationAdministration4Complex Systems in Small RotorcraftSubject equipmentAttitude Direction IndicatorSynthetic VisionAHRS i.e.MEMS technologyAir

4、 DataNavigationHTAWSTrafficWeatherRAD ALTAutopilots/stability augmentationSystem integrationCertification Bases that range from CAR 6 to part 27 amndt.46Intended FunctionWill it only be used for Day/Night VFR?Single/Dual PilotCAT A/CAT BFHA/SSAProper hazards classificationProper design levels,includ

5、ing softwareRequires input from various engineering disciplines and Pilots5Federal AviationAdministration514 CFR 2X.1301 Comparison 2X.1301:Each item of installed equipment must-Be of a kind and design appropriate to its intended function;Be labeled as to its function and operational limitations Be

6、installed according to its limitations Function properly when installed.Although the rule&its application are the same,they result in different requirements due to the platforms design&operational differences.6Federal AviationAdministration62X.1309 Comparison2X.1309:While there are some differences

7、in the 14 CFR Parts 23,25,27,29,in general,they all say that each item should be safe and reliable and not adversely affect any other system.Basically,this is the regulation that requires that hazards posed by the systems installed on aircraft must be addressed as part of the certification process.R

8、ESOURCES AC 27/29.1309 SAE ARP4754“Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems”.SAE ARP4761Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.Other published AC Guidance(e.g.,21-40,27-1B,29-2B),FAA Orders,RTCA Documents.7Federal A

9、viationAdministration727.1309&29.1309 Comparison It is assumed that the basic Part 27 aircraft will be certified VFR.27.1309 on a VFR Helicopter does not address systems whose failure conditions are assessed to be higher than major(i.e.hazardous or catastrophic).May require special conditions If the

10、 rotorcraft is to be certified for IFR flight,then you must use 27 appendix“B”which invokes some Part 29 rules including portions of 29.1309.8Federal AviationAdministration8Guidance Material AC 27.1B,27.1309 provides guidance for compliance to FAR 27.1309 AC 29-2C,29.1309 provides guidance for compl

11、iance to FAR 29.1309 Both ACs recognize SAE-ARP 4761/4754 System Safety Assessment(SSA)process AC 20-174 for compliance to the new ARP 4754A.9Federal AviationAdministration9Compliance to 27/29.1309XX.1309 Compliance Data:Qualitative&Quantitative analysis required for Catastrophic,Hazardous,and for c

12、omplex systems that have Major failure classifications.FHA,PSSA,FTA,FMEA&CCA required.Must Substantiate probability of failure reqmts.Only Qualitative assessment required for non-complex Major and Minor systems.No probability of failure substantiation required.10Federal AviationAdministration10Safet

13、y Assessment Process Functional Hazard Assessment(FHA)Aircraft Level&Systems Level FHAs Used to Identify Effects(i.e.Failure Condition Categories)of System Failures on Aircraft 5 Failure Condition Categories Catastrophic Hazardous/Severe-Major Major Minor No-Effect11Federal AviationAdministration11S

14、ystem Safety Assessment hardware requirements Catastrophic-1 x 10-9 probability of Occurrence Hazardous/Severe-Major-1 x 10-7 Major-1 x 10-5 Minor-1 x 10-3 No-Effect-no probability of occurrence reqmts.As defined in AC27/29.1309&SAE ARP4761 Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment

15、 Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.12Federal AviationAdministration12System Safety Assessment Software&AEH Requirements RTCA/DO-178B Software Level and RTCA/DO-254 AEH Level Commensurate with Failure Condition Category Level A(Catastrophic)Level B(Hazardous/Severe-Major)Level C(Major)L

16、evel D(Minor)Level E(No Safety Effect)13Federal AviationAdministration13Assessing the Effects of FailuresIntegration of Cockpit Display Systems and Pilot Interface In addition to the systems engineering specialists,both flight test and HF evaluation of pilot-system interface is used to evaluate and

17、classify the hazard level of a particular failure condition.Especially if it involves the pilot system interface(control or misrepresentation to the pilot of information)14Federal AviationAdministration14Issues to be aware of:FHA should not be accomplished after system design and installation.Primar

18、y purpose of FHA is to set design standards;not to appease FAA Do not use the equipment reliability to define failure classification.The highest hazard classification for equipment that is not required by certification or operational rules NOT is“minor”.15Federal AviationAdministration15FHA/SSA ques

19、tions for the group Should the hazard classification/threat to the aircraft and or occupants change for misleading information as a function of Its Required vs.non-required in CAR 6/part 27?What if it can be classified as“safety enhancing”equipment?Its being installed to satisfy and Operational equi

20、pment requirements i.e.(135)?16Federal AviationAdministration16Discussion Time:Back to Kim17Federal AviationAdministration17Questions to industry and the FAA:Do we,the FAA and industry,understand the risk tradeoffs if we allow the installation of equipment with a lower level of certitude than our gu

21、idance allows?Given the unique characteristics of rotorcraft What are the risk tradeoffs and what do they buy us?Do we get a net gain in safety(as reflected by lower accident numbers)?How are we discouraging applicants and operators from installing safety enhancing equipment that is not required by any regulations?Are we going to exacerbate poor pilot decision making by providing a system that may provide a false sense of security(i.e.“snow tire syndrome”)