国际贸易：Chapter10 The Political Economy of Trade Policy.ppt

1、Slides prepared by Thomas BishopCopyright 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 10 The Political Economy of Trade Policy Preview The cases for free trade The cases against free trade Political models of trade policy International Negotiations of Trade Policy The Cases for Free Tr

2、ade (支持自由贸易的观点) 很少国家能做到真正的自由贸易。尽管如此，自斯密 时代以来，经济学家仍一直倡导自由贸易，并将其作 为贸易政策的奋斗目标。 但是，倡导自由贸易的原因并不象这个思想本身一样 简单。自由贸易可以避免保护政策所带来的效率损失 。除了消除生产与消费的扭曲，自由贸易还能产生额 外的收益。即使在认为自由贸易并非绝对完美之策的 经济学家中，仍有许多人相信在通常情况下自由贸易 比其他任何可供采取的替代政策都要好。 Free Trade and Efficiency (自由贸易和效率) The efficiency case for free trade(自由贸易的效率).The f

3、irst case for free trade is the argument that producers and consumers allocate resources most efficiently when governments do not distort market prices through trade policy. National welfare of a small country is highest with free trade. With restricted trade, consumers pay higher prices. With restr

4、icted trade, distorted prices cause overproduction either by existing firms producing more or by more firms entering the industry. Fig. 1: The Efficiency Case for Free Trade A trade restriction, such as a tariff, leads to production and consumption distortions. 关税会带来生产和 消费效率的扭曲。 Additional Gains fro

5、m Free Trade (自由贸易的额外收益) Yet when quotas are used instead of tariffs, costs can be magnified(放大) through rent seeking(寻租寻租). To seek quota licenses or the rights to sell a restricted number of imports and the profit that they will earn, individuals or institutions need to spend time and other resour

6、ces. 例如美国罐装金枪鱼的关税配额政策，导致每年以较 低关税进口金枪鱼的权利变成“谁先进口谁得利”。 Thus, another reason why trade allocates resources efficiently is that it avoids the loss of resources through rent seeking.(自由贸易避免了寻租所带来的效率损失) Additional Gains from Free Trade(cont.) A second argument for free trade is that it allows firms or ind

7、ustry to take advantage of economies of scale. 在被保护的市场中，不仅生产被分割，而且由于减少了 竞争和提高了利润，从而吸引了太多的厂商进入被保护 的行业。在一个狭小的国内市场中拥挤着那么多的厂商， 各厂商的生产规模都很小。 中国的汽车工业生产规模不足就是一个很好的例子。根据国际 惯例，一个有效率的汽车组装厂年产汽车应该达到8-20万辆。而 中国1999年只生产了183.2万辆汽车，国内的汽车生产厂家却有 近千家！中国以80%-100%的汽车进口关税维持国内汽车生产的 高利润显然是中国汽车厂家小规模生产但仍然存活的重要原因。 Additional

8、Gains from Free Trade(cont.) A third argument for free trade is that it provides competition and opportunities for learning and innovation. 自由贸易后，企业可以寻求新的出口途径和参与同进 口产品的竞争，从而获得比管理贸易下多得多的学习 和革新的机会。 These are dynamic benefits, unlike the static benefits of eliminating the efficiency losses caused by di

9、storted prices and overproduction. Political Argument for Free Trade Another argument, called the political argument for free trade(主张自由贸易的政治 依据), says that free trade is the best feasible political policy, even though there may be better policies in principle. Any policy that deviates from free tra

10、de would be quickly manipulated by political groups or subverted by the political process(任何非自由贸易 政策都可能会被利益集团所控制或被政治决策过程 所扭曲), leading to decreased national welfare. The Cases Against Free Trade (反对自由贸易/支持贸易保护的观点) 大部分关税、进口配额及其他贸易政策措施的实施主 要都是为了保护某些特殊利益集团的收入。但政治家 们总是宣称他们采取这些措施都是为了国家的利益， 当然他们有时候所说的也确是事

11、实。虽然经济学家们 一般都认为贸易保护会减少社会福利，但事实上一些 理论研究也表明积极的贸易政策有时可以增进社会福 利。 The Terms of Trade Argument for a Tariff(赞成关税的贸易条件改善论) For a “large” country, a tariff or quota lowers the price of imports in world markets and generates a terms of trade gain. This benefit may exceed the losses caused by distortions in p

12、roduction and consumption. In fact, a small tariff will lead to an increase in national welfare for a large country. But at some tariff rate, the national welfare will begin to decrease as the economic efficiency loss exceeds the terms of trade gain. Fig. 2: The Optimum Tariff 对于大国而言，存在着一个最优关税t0， 在这

13、一点上，从贸易条件改善中获得的 边际收益正好等于生产和消费扭曲所带 来的边际效率损失。 The Optimum Tariff(最优关税) For a large country, there is an optimum tariff t0 at which the marginal gain from improved terms of trade just equals the marginal efficiency loss from production and consumption distortion. A tariff rate tp that completely prohib

14、its imports leaves a country worse off, but tariff rate t0 may exist that maximizes national welfare: an optimum tariff. The optimum export tax is positive but less than the prohibitive tax(禁止性关税) that would eliminate export completely. What policy would the terms of trade argument dictate for expor

15、t sectors? An export tax (a negative export subsidy) (出 口税或负向的出口补贴)may exist that maximizes national welfare through the terms of trade. An export subsidy lowers the terms of trade for a large country; an export tax raises the terms of trade for a large country. An export tax may raise the price of

16、exports in the world market, increasing the terms of trade. Counter-Argument Most small countries have very little ability to affect the world price of either their imports or exports, so that the terms of trade argument is of little practical importance. For some countries like the U.S. an import t

17、ariff or and export tax could improve national welfare at the expense of other countries. But this argument ignores the likelihood that other countries may retaliate against(报复) large countries by enacting their own trade restrictions. The Domestic Market Failure Argument Against Free Trade (反对自由贸易的

18、国内市场失灵论) A second argument against free trade is that domestic market failures(国内市场失灵国内市场失灵) may exist that cause free trade to be a suboptimal policy(次优政策). The economic efficiency loss calculations using consumer and producer surplus assume that markets function well(市场能够正常发挥作用). Domestic market f

19、ailures may exist, so that consumer and producer surplus do not properly measure the costs and benefits of trade protection. Types of Market Failures Persistently high under-employment of workers. Persistently high under-utilization of structures, equipment and other forms of capital. Technological

20、benefits for society discovered through private production, but from which private firms can not fully profit. Environmental costs for society caused by private production, but for which private firms do not fully pay. sellers that are not well informed about the (opportunity) cost of production or

21、buyers that are not well informed about value from consumption. Domestic Market Failure and Marginal Social Benefit Economists calculate the marginal social benefit(边际社会收益边际社会收益) to represent the additional benefit to society from private production. With a market failure, marginal social benefit is

22、 not accurately measured by the producer surplus of private firms, so that economic efficiency loss calculations are misleading. It is possible that when a tariff increases domestic production, the benefit to domestic society will increase due to a market failure. Fig. 3: The Domestic Market Failure

23、 Argument for a Tariff If production of a good yields extra social benefits (measured by area c), a tariff can increase welfare. Domestic Market Failure and Theory of the Second Best The domestic market failure argument against free trade is an example of a more general argument called the theory of

24、 the second best(次优理论次优理论). This theory states that a hands-off (自由放任) policy is desirable in any one market only if all other markets are working properly. If they are not, a government intervention which distorts market incentives in one market may increase national welfare by offsetting the conse

25、quences of market failures elsewhere. 次优理论认为，在任何一个市场上，只有所有其他市 场都能正常发挥作用时，自由放任才是最理想的政策； 如果不是这样，政府干预虽会扭曲市场激励，但有可 能通过抵消市场失灵的影响而增加国家福利。 Counter-Arguments Economists supporting free trade counter- argue that domestic market failures should be corrected by a “first-best” policy: a domestic policy aimed di

26、rectly at the source of the problem.(国内市场失灵应该由直接针对问题根 源的国内最优政策来修正) If persistently high under-employment of labor is a problem, then the cost of labor or production of labor-intensive products could be subsidized by the government. These subsidies could avoid the economic efficiency losses due to a

27、tariff. 例如，如果存在持续的高失业率，适度发展劳动密集 型产业、优化国内产业结构都是除贸易干预政策以外 的国内政策。 Counter-Arguments (cont.) Because it is unclear when and to what degree a market failure exists in the real world, it is unclear when and to what degree government policies should respond. Government policies to address market failures a

28、re likely to be manipulated by politically powerful groups(针对国内市场失灵的贸 易政策容易被政治权利集团操控). 基于以上原因，捍卫自由贸易观点的专家认为，使用贸 易政策来处理国内市场失灵不是最有效的对策，只是次 优的。如果市场失灵没有坏到不可收拾的地步，自由贸 易是最好的选择。 Political Models of Trade Policy How is trade policy determined? Models that address these questions: 1.Median voter theorem 2.Co

29、llective action 3.A model of trade policy that combines aspects of collective action and the median voter theorem Median Voter Theorem (中点选民理论) The median voter theorem predicts that democratic political parties may change their policies to court(争取) the voter in the middle of the ideological spectr

30、um(意识形态范围) (i.e., the median voter). Median Voter Theorem (cont.) Assumptions of the model: 1. There are two competing political parties. 2. The objective of each party is to get elected by majority vote. 3. The ideological spectrum is defined only by a tariff rate policy. 4. Voters can be ranked ac

31、cording to whether they desire high or low tariff rates. What policies will the parties promise to follow? Fig. 4: Political Competition 中点选民模型 假设本国有11个选民，根据他们对关税率的意见从低 到高进行排列（如图4所示）。 假设第1人主张关税率为1%，第2人主张2%，依此类 推，第9人主张9%。 中点选民是第5个，意见是关税率定在5%。 再假设本国有两个政党，民主党和社会党。两党都想 得到大多数选民的支持。 在贸易政策的选择中，民主党选择了征收10%的

32、关税 ，而社会党选择征收征收9%的关税。这时，主张高关 税的选民（10、11）就会支持民主党，但主张低关税 的选民（包括从第1到第9个选民）都会支持社会党。 中点选民模型(续) 从第1到第9个选民的意见虽然没有被采纳，但是相 对于主张10%关税的民主党，社会党更接近他们的 意见。 再反过来看，假如民主党主张3%的关税，社会党主 张4%的关税，那么只有第1到第3的3个选民支持民 主党，其他8个选民会偏向社会党。 因此，越接近中点选民意见的政策越能得到大多数越接近中点选民意见的政策越能得到大多数 选民的支持选民的支持。 Median Voter Theorem (cont.) Thus, the

33、median voter theorem implies that a two-party democracy should enact trade policy based on how many voters it pleases. A policy that inflicts large losses on a few people but benefits a large number of people should be enacted into law. But trade policy doesnt seem to follow this prediction. 中点选民理论意

34、味着，一项使少数人蒙受巨大损失而 让大多数人受益的政策应该得到实施。然而，现实中 政府往往推行牺牲大多数人利益而保护少数人利益的 贸易保护政策，例如发达国家对农产品的贸易保护。 为什么？ Collective Action and Free Rider (集体行动与搭便车) Political activity is often described as a collective action problem: While consumers as a group have an incentive to advocate free trade, each individual consume

35、r has no incentive because his benefit is not large compared to the cost and time required to advocate free trade. Policies that impose large losses for society as a whole but small losses on each individual may therefore not face strong opposition. Collective Action However, for those groups who ma

36、y suffer large losses from free trade (for example, unemployment), each individual in that group has a strong incentive to advocate the policy he desires. In this case, the cost and time required to advocate restricted trade is small compared to the cost of unemployment. 集体行动与搭便车 美国经济学家曼瑟尔奥尔森指出：代表团体

37、利 益的政治行为是一种利众行为，也就是说，这 种行为将有利于团体中的所有成员，而不仅仅 有利于实施这一行为的个人。 假设某个消费者给所在选区的国会议员写了一 封信，要求降低他所喜爱的某种进口商品的关 税率，而且这封信的确改变了该议员的初衷， 进而使降低关税的议案得以通过。那么所有购 买该进口商品的消费者，即使他们并没有劳神 写信，也可以从降低了的价格中获益。 这就意味着贸易政策具有公共品（public goods）的特 性。贸易政策的公共品特性又意味着贸易政策的消费 者（受益者）具有搭便车（free rider）的倾向。搭便车 的存在使得那些虽然在总体上损失巨大，但是任何个 人的损失都很小的政

38、策不会遭到有效的反对。这就是 奥尔森所说的集体行动的困难：当施加压力以谋求某 种政策的行为是有利于集团的整体利益时，那么从个 人的利益出发谁都不愿意去做。 一个集体中的人越多，搭便车的人就越多，积极参与 的人反而越少，意见也不容易统一，集体行动的效率 就低。而人越少反而更容易组织得好。 集体行动难题最容易解决的是在规模较小的群体中 （因为群体中的每位成员都能从有利的政策中获取一 份较大的收益）或者在组织良好的集团中（因为组织 中的成员能够被动员去维护组织的利益）。 因此，集体行动的困难解释了为什么有的政策虽然得 不偿失且使大部分人的利益受损却仍旧被采纳。 在实践中，贸易政策保护的恰恰是少数人的

39、利益。例 如，几乎所有发达国家都保护农产品，而农民占这些 国家的总人口都不到10%。在发展中国家，农民占大多 数，但是农民的利益往往得不到保护。 Which Industries Are Protected? Agriculture: in the U.S., Europe, and Japan farmers make up a small fraction of the electorate(选民) but receive generous subsidies and trade protection. Examples: European Unions Common Agricultur

40、al Policy, Japans 1000% tariff on imported rice in the middle of 1990s, Americas sugar quota. Clothing: textiles (fabrication of cloth) and apparel (assembly of cloth into clothing). Until 2005, quotas licenses granted to textile and apparel exporters were specified in the Multi-Fiber Agreement(多边纤维

41、协定) between the U.S. and many other nations. Table 1: Welfare Costs of U.S. Protection ($ billion) 随着多边纤维协定（是1994年“乌拉圭回合”贸易谈判 协定中的一个重要条款，2004年废止）的终止，美国服装 业贸易保护的成本和美国贸易保护的总成本都大幅下降。 Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Potential Gains from Free Trade 世界银行估计了完全自由化的福利收益（即废除所有贸易 壁垒和出口补贴）的来源和它如何在各国进行分配。在当

42、今世界上，农产品贸易额不到整个世界贸易额的10%，但 是，根据世界银行的估计，农产品自由贸易可以为世界带 来63%的自由贸易利益。然而，由于贸易保护政策，这些 收益很难获得。 A Model of Trade Policy A good trade policy should combine aspects of collective action and the median voter theorem.(合理的 贸易政策的制定应结合集体行动理论和中点选民理论) While politicians may win elections(选举) partly because they advoc

43、ate popular policies as implied by the median voter theorem, they also require funds to run campaigns(竞选资金). These funds may especially come from groups who do not have a collective action problem and are willing to advocate a special interest policy. Models of trade restriction policy try to measur

44、e the trade off between the reduction in welfare of constituents as a whole and the increase in campaign contributions from special interests. International Negotiations of Trade Policy The average US tariff rate on dutiable imports has decreased substantially from 19201993. Since 1944, much of the

45、reduction in tariffs and other trade restrictions came about through international negotiations. The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was begun in 1947 as a provisional international agreement and was replaced by a more formal international institution called the World Trade Organizatio

46、n(WTO) in 1995. International Negotiations (多边协调) of Trade Policy (cont.) International Negotiations of Trade Policy (cont.) Multilateral negotiation mobilize exporters to support free trade if they believe export markets will expand. This support would be lacking in a unilateral(单边 的) push for free

47、 trade. This support counteracts the support for restricted trade by import-competing groups. International Negotiations of Trade Policy (cont.) Multilateral negotiations also help avoid a trade war between countries, where each country enacts trade restrictions. If each country has a political interest (due to political pressure) to protect domestic producers, regardless of what other countries do, then all countries could enact trade restrictions, even if it is in the interest of all countries to have free trade.